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2 ABSTRACT 
Tax avoidance is the legal utilisation of the tax regime to one's own advantage, to 
reduce the amount of tax that is payable by means that are within the law. Tax evasion 
entails taxpayers deliberately misrepresenting or concealing the true state of their affairs 
to the tax authorities in order to reduce their tax liability, and includes, in particular, 
dishonest tax reporting (such as declaring less income, profits or gains than actually 
earned; or overstating the deductions). The revised general anti-avoidance measures 
were introduced in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 ('the Act') on 2 November 2006 in 
the form of section 80A to 80L, in order to replace the complicated and confusing as 
well as ineffective anti-avoidance measures contained in section 103(1). 
Keywords: 
Tax avoidance; Tax evasion; Planning; Lack of commercial substance; Impermissible 
tax avoidance arrangements; Substance versus form; Misuse and abuse; Reportable 
arrangements 
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3. INTRODUCTION 
Tax avoidance refers to a situation in which a taxpayer, within the provisions of the tax 
statutes, arranges his affairs so that his tax obligation is minimised or completely 
avoided. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2004: 
International Tax Terms op.cit.n4.), similarly defines tax avoidance somewhat 
awkwardly, as an 'arrangement of a taxpayer's affairs that is intended to reduce his 
liability and that although the arrangement could be strictly legal, it is usually in 
contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow.' Tax avoidance is not tax 
evasion. Tax evasion is where a taxpayer unlawfully arranges his affairs in such a way 
that he escapes any tax liability which he ought to pay. 1 As such, tax evasion connotes 
criminal liability whereas tax avoidance does not. 
Tax avoidance also reduces the state's revenue and brings the tax system into disrepute, 
so governments need to prevent tax avoidance or keep it within limits. It is generally 
accepted that the taxpayer is entitled to arrange his affairs so that his liability for income 
tax is minimised. But if the taxpayer arranges his affairs unlawfully so as to pay less 
tax, the taxpayer is taxed at the maximum rate permissible and a penalty imposed in 
terms of s 75 and additional tax in terms of s 76 ofthe Act. 
Tax avoidance does not only result in obvious short-term revenue loss, but longer-term 
damage to the tax system and economy. These other effects include a corrosive effect 
upon taxpayer compliance, the uneconomic allocation of resources, upward pressure on 
marginal tax rates, an unfair redistribution of the tax burden, and a weakening of the 
ability of Parliament and National Treasury to set and implement economic policy? 
I Tsatsawane, K. (JBL Volume 9), part 1at 9 
2 Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
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4. TERMINOLOGY 
4.1 General problem: Avoidance, Evasion and Planning 
Debates on tax avoidance often begin with an attempt to define and distinguish three 
broad concepts: (1) 'impermissible' tax avoidance; (2) tax evasion and (3) legitimate tax 
planning or 'tax mitigation'. While there is a typical agreement over the meaning of 'tax 
evasion', the other concepts are more debatable.3 
4.2 Terms Used 
Both the taxpayers and the South African Revenue Service must fully understand the 
definitions of the above basic concepts if there is a doubt concerning any tax avoidance 
transaction or an agreement resulting in tax avoidance. These concepts also help to 
expose an agreement or a transaction involving tax avoidance. The categories do help to 
identify types of behaviour across a scale that ranges from a 'simple' tax planning at 
one end to criminal tax evasion at the other. 4 
The definitions below have been drawn from a number of sources, including 
publications by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEeD), 
reports by revenue authorities and commissions in other countries, judicial decisions, 
and critical commentaries. It is hoped that they will help to minimise misunderstandings 
due to differences in semantics. 
4.2.1 Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance is defined as 'using perfectly' legal methods of arranging one's affairs so 
as to pay less tax.5 At the other extreme, tax evasion is regarded as an evil because by 
escaping his fair share of the tax burden, the taxpayer forces the State to recover the lost 
revenue by increasing taxes on other taxpayers. Also such an agreement or arrangement 
3 Lord Hoffman in MacNiven v Westmoreland [2001] STC 237 at 257 
4 Cooke, P. in Haddle and Sydney Bridge Nominees Ltd v CIR (1991) 13 NZTC 8,116 (CA) 
at 8, 122 
5IRC v Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1 at 19 
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amounting to tax avoidance must be based on actual facts and circumstances and must 
be legally enforceable within the parameters of South African law generally. 
Tax avoidance can be done by way of transfer pricing between connected parties in such 
a way that income is transferred to the lower tax-based jurisdiction, or alternatively to a 
taxpayer who is in an assessed loss position. This consensus on the legal nature of tax 
avoidance is contrasted by diverging views on the morality of such avoidance. (For 
example, it was held in Duke of Westminster v IRC 51 TLR 467, 19 TC 490, that a 
person was able to arrange his affairs so as to pay the least amount of tax without any 
moral sanction. By contrast, the general public frowns upon such schemes. Some people 
feel that the use of such schemes is in violation of equality in that higher-earning 
taxpayers are in a better position to capitalise on them). The moral acceptability of tax 
avoidance is usually defended by comparing tax avoidance with a respectable contest, 
stressing the adversarial relationship between a taxpayer, trying to protect his property, 
and the revenue authorities attempting to deplete the taxpayer's pocket by collecting as 
much tax as possible. Tax avoidance has long been accepted by the courts both in South 
Africa and in other countries. (See Duke of Westminster v Tomlin and CIR v 
Meyerowitz). Tax avoidance is a legitimate activity which the taxpayer is entitled to 
pursue, however unpopular the results of their activities may be to the fiscal authorities. 
4.2.2 Tax Evasion 
The OECD has defined 'tax evasion' as encompassing illegal arrangements through or by 
means of which liability to tax is hidden or ignored.6 That is an arrangement by which 
'the taxpayer pays less tax than he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or 
information from the tax authorities.' 7 In a tax context, it typically involves the use of 
illegal means to reduce a tax liability by falsification of books, suppression of income, 
and fraudulent non-disclosure of income and overstatement of deductions. Common 
examples of tax evasion include a deliberate failure by a 'cash' business to report the 
full amount of revenue received or the deliberate claiming of a deduction by a business 
for an expenditure it has neither incurred nor paid. 
6 Ibid 
70ECD, International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Cooperation with 
Non - OECD Economies, 2000 
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Tax evaSIOn IS simply fraud against the fiscus for which a fine or period of 
imprisonment not exceeding five years is provided in s 104 of the Act. Taxpayers, who 
enter into aggressive schemes which verge on or constitute tax evasion, or which are 
based on sham transactions, should be dealt with harshly by the courts. 
4.2.3 Tax Planning 
Tax planning is concerned with the organisation of a taxpayer's affairs (or the 
structuring of transactions) so that transactions give rise to the minimum tax liability 
within the law without resorting to any 'impermissible tax avoidance'. As taxpayers 
have no liability for tax other than the obligation imposed upon them by statute, it is 
theoretically correct to say that a taxpayer may so arrange his tax affairs that he falls 
outside the ambit of the taxing act. 
Taxpayers do not incur legal penalties and, strictly speaking, no moral censure, if 
having considered the lines drawn by the legislature for the imposition of taxes, they 
structure their affairs in such a way as to minimise tax liability, without resorting to tax 
evasion.8 In short, the hallmark of tax mitigation is that the taxpayer takes advantage of 
a fiscally attractive option afforded to him by the tax legislation and genuinely suffers 
the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking 
advantage of the option.9 
5 ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF T AX AVOIDANCE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
The provision of s 103(1) of the Act used to contain the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
(GAAR). Since the beginning of the 20th century, with the growth of modern welfare and 
the industrial state, and the increasingly burdensome imposition of income and other 
taxes, the practice of tax avoidance has grown amongst those aggrieved owing to the 
fact of paying an unequal share of the tax burden. They have had to contend with 
seeking out loopholes in the taxing statutes, such that would enable them to diminish 
their tax liability. The initial response of the authorities was to plug each hole as it 
8 Levene v IRe (1928) AC at 227 
9 CIR v Willoughby [1997] 4 All ER 65 at 73 
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appeared. This proved largely unsuccessful and the assistance of a more general anti-
avoidance provision will corne to the aid of the authorities. 
In simple terms, s 103(1) empowered the South African Revenue Service to disregard 
avoidance schemes and to tax the taxpayer as though they had not been embarked upon, 
subject to all the criteria in s 103(1) being operative. The Income Tax Act contains both 
specific anti-avoidance and general anti-avoidance sections. The difference between the 
specific and the general anti-avoidance sections is that the specific anti-avoidance 
provisions are incorporated into each section and are precise, whereas the general anti-
avoidance rules (s 80A to 80L) enable the Commissioner to address avoidance not 
covered by the specific remedies. 10 
Although s 103(1) was no doubt designed to enable the Commissioner to deal 
effectively with tax avoidance schemes, it was limited in the sense that all four 
requirements laid down in the section, had to be fulfilled before the Commissioner 
could invoke the section. I I Broadly speaking, the section empowers the Commissioner 
to determine a taxpayer's liability for income tax and other taxes by disregarding any 
abnormal transaction which the latter has entered into for the purpose of avoiding or 
postponing a tax liability or reducing the amount thereof. A transaction is regarded as 
abnormal if it was entered into or carried out by a means or in a manner which would 
not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction in 
question, or has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm's length. An abnormal transaction may be disregarded if 
it was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purpose of the avoidance or 
the postponement of liability for the payment of any tax or the reduction of the amount 
of such liability. 12 
In accordance with s 103(1), the taxpayer's liability for tax purposes must be 
determined either as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or 
carried out or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case is deemed appropriate 
for preventing the tax avoidance or tax liability. It does not necessarily follow that, 
10 Notes on South African Income Tax (2008) at 416 
II Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd, 61 SATe at 391 
12 CIR v IHB King & AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A) at 2009 
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because a transaction, operation or scheme was entered into and had the effect of 
avoiding an anticipated liability for tax that it will be hit by s 103(1) of the Act. The 
provision of s 103(1) will be inapplicable if that transaction falls within the limits of 
normality or the means, manner, rights and obligations prescribed by s 103(I)(i) and (ii) 
which state the following: 
'When a transaction, operation or scheme is an agreement, it is important to determine ftrstly whether 
it was one concluded at arm's length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii). Dealing at arms' 
length is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start an enquiry. It connotes 
that each party is independent of the other and in so dealing will strive to get the utmost possible 
advantage out of the transaction for himself. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and 
obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged 
by Para (ii).' [See Hicklin v Secretary For Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA, 481 (A)] 
The means or manner employed in entering into an agreement or carrying it out are also 
more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i). (See Hicklin 
supra) 
The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the rights or obligations 
so created or of the means or manner so employed due regard has to be paid to the 
surrounding circumstances. The provision of s 103(1) itself postulates that. Thus what 
may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into 
or carrying out of an agreement in one case may be abnormal in an agreement of the 
same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances. The last 
observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a 
factual one. The court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the 
relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced thereto 
by either party. 13 
The provision of s 103(1) was introduced with the aim of combating tax avoidance 
which was long in existence both in South Africa and other countries, such as Canada; 
New Zealand; Australia etc. Both the taxpayer and the South African Revenue Service 
thought that it would be a simple tool to be implemented, but this proved to be 
incorrect. This section needed to be tested in the courts to see what the outcome would 
13 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) 
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be, before it could be fully operational. There are certain requirements which have to be 
met before s 103(1) applies. In simple terms, s 103(1) requires the following: 
(a) a transaction, operation or scheme 
(b) which must have the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for the 
payment of tax or reducing the amount thereof, and 
(c) which must have been entered into using abnormal means; and 
(d) which must have been entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the 
purposes of obtaining a tax benefit 
Though these requirements seem clear and simple, the amount of litigation (See for 
example SIR v Hicklin and CIR v Meyerowitz) suggests otherwise. Only when a 
taxpayer's transaction falls squarely within the ambit of the above provisions is the 
Commissioner entitled to apply the section. 14 Therefore, there are certain circumstances 
in which s 103(1) may not be applied, as for example when the parties are striving to 
obtain the maximum possible advantage for themselves (12 supra. In such a case the 
abnormality clause would not be operative and the relevant section under which the 
taxpayer sought to have the income taxed or the deduction allowed will be applicable). 
In Hicklin v SIR, the taxpayer (Mr Hicklin) and his two co-shareholders sold their 
dormant company to a dividend-stripping company. The purchase price of the company 
was equal to the net asset value of the company, less 10 percent of the distributable 
reserves. However, the agreement between the sellers and the dividend-stripper was an 
arm's length transaction in which each party was striving to obtain the maximum 
possible advantage. 
The court held that the abnormality requirement was not satisfied as there was no reason 
to evade tax, other than tax advantages and the reason was to get rid of the dormant 
company which had become a burden [(2008), Notes on South African Income Tax, at 
434)]. The attitude displayed towards tax avoidance by the courts in certain recent cases 
involving tax avoidance schemes, the application by the courts of the substance over 
form doctrine, and the introduction of the 'business purpose test' in s 103(1) the Act, 
have created additional uncertainty for taxpayers who wish to enter into tax avoidance 
14 Tsatsawane K JBL 9, part 1, at 9 
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schemes and for their advisers. IS An article on tax avoidance by Professor Maeve Kolitz 
(1991) 13 Tax Planning 105; states that l6 -
'Successful tax avoidance has required the taxpayer to walk a fine line between staying outside the 
provisions of the Act and falling foul of the anti-avoidance provisions, which have been included in 
the Act to empower the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service to take action against 
tax avoidance schemes. For example, the general anti-avoidance provisions of s 103(1) which can be 
used by the Commissioner to evaluate any tax avoidance scheme that meets the requirements of the 
section. It was for many years the generally accepted view that a taxpayer could enter into a tax 
avoidance scheme and, provided that there was nothing abnormal about the means or manner in 
which the scheme was entered into, and about the rights and obligations it created, then the scheme 
could not be successfully attacked by the Commissioner, under the provisions of s 103(1).' 
The aggressive use of tax avoidance schemes which were often based on sophisticated 
financing structures became widespread in South Africa after 1985 and involved 
millions of rands. In some instances, the schemes went beyond constituting tax 
avoidance and probably amounted to tax evasion. Losses to the fiscus of the magnitude 
encountered inevitably provoked a strong reaction. (15 supra) 
The provision of s 103(1), created uncertainty between the taxpayer and the South 
African Revenue Service. The decisions taken by the Courts were inconsistent in that in 
certain cases, the taxpayer was able to escape the provisions because; all four factors 
enunciated in s 103(1) were not present, but by the same token on other occasions the 
judgments did not strictly adhere to the provisions of s 103(1) and the court found in the 
favour of the Commissioner. 
The Minister of Finance together with a team of experts decided to bring into play new 
anti-avoidance provisions which replaced s 103(1). Even though the new legislation is 
not specifically supported by case law, the new rules are more prescriptive in nature and 
are less dependent on the courts for the purpose of interpretation. There are however a 
number of similarities between the old and the new provisions and certain of the 
principles established in the cases will still be relevant. As s 80A to 80L are fairly strict, 
the courts are likely to interpret the provisions less harshly as far as taxpayers are 
15 12 supra 
16 See article on Tax Avoidance by Maeve Kolitz: (1999) 13 Tax Planning 105 
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concerned. Abnonnality clauses must be cogent; there must be business reasons for 
entering into a transaction. 
5.2 Comparisons and differences between s 103(1) and s 80A to 80L 
The general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) was previously governed by s 103(1) of the 
Income Tax Act. The South African Revenue Service found that the provisions in s 
103(1) were an effective deterrent to certain avoidance arrangements. 17 These 
provisions are exceptionally complex. In tracing the history of s 103(1) and its evolution 
into its present fonn, and comparing it against the background of judicial interpretation, 
the following requirements are pivotal, namely: 
(a) an abnonnal arrangement; and 
(b) a purpose which is solely or mainly tax avoidance 
Both these requirements are contained in s 103(1) and s 80A to 80L of the Act. In order 
for a transaction to qualify in tenns of these sections, the above-mentioned requirements 
have to be met. The provision of s 103(1) was based on judicial interpretations, while s 
80A to 80L is based on clear definitions as per legislation. 
The main differences between the new provisions (s 80A to 80L) and the old s 103 are 
as follows: 
(a) connected persons are combined in detennining whether a tax benefit 
has arisen 
(b) the new provisions expand on what elements would taint an 
arrangement being; 
• business and non-business abnonnalities 
• lack of commercial substance (including a general definition and list of 
indicators) 
• ann's-length rights and obligations 
(a) misuse and abuse ofthe law 
17 Justin Liebenberg; 'Tax Partner' (2007) 1 May (Grant Thornton) 
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(b) the new provisions provide remedies to the South African Revenue 
Service if an arrangement is found to be an impermissible avoidance 
arrangement 
( c) the new provisions can apply to parts of a transaction 
5.3 Conclusion 
The provision of s 1 03( 1) contained a number of loopholes which made it difficult to 
apply in practice. It created uncertainty for the South African Revenue Service and 
taxpayers alike. Although it has long been accepted both in South Africa and in other 
countries that a taxpayer is entitled to arrange his affairs, so as to ensure that his tax 
burden is less than it otherwise would be. 
The South African Revenue Service and the taxpayer have to rely on the interpretation 
by the courts as to whether a transaction is abnormal and its purpose is to avoid tax. The 
new GAAR was introduced to avoid any uncertainties, loopholes or doubts that were 
contained in s 103(1). It was praised by other countries as a 'messiah' for the tax 
authorities in stopping tax avoidance schemes, such as Canada; New Zealand etc. 
The new GAAR should serve the country well. It should reduce the loss of revenue to the 
fiscus and help to put our economy in good shape. It should assist in preventing the 
importation of schemes from other countries. If South Africa has succeeded in properly 
framing the wording of the new GAAR, the number of abusive schemes should be 
reduced. 
6 SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
6.1 The South African situation 
Impermissible tax avoidance has been a growing problem both in South Africa and 
other countries for many years. The issue of corporate tax avoidance and evasion has 
assumed a prominent position within the South African political agenda in recent 
months. The South African Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel announced that tough new 
measures would be introduced as part of the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill to crack 
down on corporate tax avoidance. In South Africa, the problem is with the organisations 
that take advantage of our legislation, tax base and our legal system. Companies and 
16 
individuals avoid tax through vanous convertible loan structures and certain 
transactions are structured in a way that 'they show complete and reckless disregard for 
tax morality and South African tax law.' 18 Such schemes hamper efforts to alleviate 
poverty, and hinder the overall development of South Africa. In South Africa, both 
companies and individuals pay huge amounts to professionals that will structure their 
tax affairs deliberately to avoid the tax consequences that should flow from the 
associated transactions thereby robbing not only the fiscus of tax revenue, but making 
the rest of South Africans liable for the shortfall in subsequent revenues. 
The impact of global forces on the problem in South Africa has been exacerbated by 
local factors as well. These include the major changes that have been made to the South 
African income tax system over the past few years, including the shift from source to 
residency based taxation, the concomitant enactment of new 'controlled foreign 
company' rules, the introduction of a new tax on capital gains and the adaption of new 
company restructuring rules. At its worst, the very complexity of some of these new 
provisions can interfere with legitimate business transactions; and in some cases 
actually create new opportunities for mischief. At the same time, advances in computer 
and telecommunication technology have radically transformed the way in which 
multinational firms, particularly multinational accounting firms can share and exchange 
information. As a result, new tax avoidance schemes that are developed in the United 
Kingdom or the United States can now migrate to South Africa almost immediately for 
practical purposes, rather than taking months if not years to do so, as they might have in 
the past. This effectively puts the South African Revenue Service on the front line with 
the most advanced tax administrators in the world in combating these schemes. If the 
South African tax system becomes more aligned with the systems in the OEeD countries, 
the chances of avoiding tax will be minimal. Though huge costs will be incurred by the 
South African government, this will be a good strategy to combat tax avoidance. 
17 Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
(Act No 58 of 1962), 2005 
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6.2 Causes 
The forces driving these trends differ from one country to another. Major factors include 
globalisation, increasing deregulation, particularly in the financial markets19, and rapid 
advances in computer and telecommunications technology. Crime, unemployment and 
other factors reduce investors' confidence in business and they are unprepared to pay 
their fair tax share to the South African Revenue Service. Companies are then motivated 
to seek out professionals to structure their tax affairs in such a way that they avoid tax 
for their businesses to increase their profit margins. Changing attitudes and market 
forces also play a major role. Thus, for example, 'the United States Department of 
Treasury has noted that some commentators explain the growth in corporate shelters as 
a reflection of more accepting attitudes of tax advisors and corporate executives toward 
aggressive tax planning. ,20 At the same time, lucrative markets for tax avoidance 
schemes and 'tax optimisation' plans have led to an increase in the resources and talent 
being devoted to those areas by professional firms in many countries.21 
6.3 The Harm Caused by Impermissible Tax Avoidance 
The harm caused by impermissible tax avoidance is different and persistent. They 
include short-term revenue loss, growing disrespect for the tax system and the law, 
increasingly complex tax legislation, the uneconomic allocation of resources, unfair 
shifting of the tax burden, and a weakening of the ability of Parliament and National 
Treasury to set and implement economic policy.22 Short-term revenue loss is clearly the 
most immediate and obvious problem, but by no means the only problem. 
6.3.1 Short-term revenue loss 
The most immediate harm caused by impermissible tax avoidance is short-term revenue 
loss. Accurate estimates of the size of the problem are difficult to make, whether in 
South Africa or elsewhere. This has become a huge problem that South Africa is facing 
and it is also a challenge. Short-term revenue loss makes it difficult for the government 
to engage in proper planning. In part, these difficulties are due to disagreements about 
what constitutes impermissible tax avoidance; in part due to the fact that many schemes 
19 The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, op. cit. at 16 
20 The problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, op cit. n 19, at 19 
21 A taxing battle The Economist (29 Jan. 2004) 
22 Ralph Final Report, op. cit. n 5, at s. 6.2 (c); Brooks, M and Head, J, op.cit. n 7, at 53 
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are deliberately designed to avoid detection. There is no question however, that the 
amounts at stake are substantial. 23 
6.3.2 Cost to the Economy 
At a deeper level, impermissible tax avoidance creates significant deadweight losses for 
the economy by distorting trade and investment flows. 24 In particular, avoidance 
schemes often involve a re- or misallocation of resources from productive investments 
to activities that are, at best marginally profitable on a pre-tax basis.25 These distortions 
reduce economic efficiency and impede growth?6 
As the OECD has flatly stated: 'Tax avoidance and tax evasion are economically 
costly. ,27 These costs arise in a number of ways. At a basic level, to the extent that 
impermissible tax avoidance inevitably results in new amendments, more complex 
legislation and increasingly comprehensive and detailed reporting requirements, 
administrative costs and compliance burdens swell for both taxpayers and the 
government.28 Additional costs are reflected in the resources that are diverted from 
productive investment to the development, marketing, implementation and subsequent 
defence of impermissible tax avoidance schemes. These so-called 'avoidance costs' can 
be substantial. Professional fees can often amount to a significant percentage of the 
promised tax benefits, especially in situations involving contingent fees or 'value 
billing' arrangements. 
6.3.3 Disrespect for the Tax System and the Law 
While short-term revenue loss may be the most immediate problem, it is by no means 
the most serious. Impermissible tax avoidance also encourages 'disrespect for the tax 
system - both by the people who participate in the tax shelter market and by others who 
2JFirst Interim Report of the Commission ofInquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of 
South Africa (18 November 1994) at para. 5.l.6; Report of the Margo Commission, para. 27.4 
24p Groenewegen, Distributional and Allocation Effects of Tax Avoidance, in D Collins ed., Tax 
Avoidance and the Economy, (Sydney, Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1984) at 23 
25 Ibid. 
26 Bankman, J, op. cit. n 35, at 18 
27 OECD, Forces Shaping Tax Policy, at 165 
28 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition .... op. cit. n 17, at 30 
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perceive unfairness.'29 Even the New York State Bar Association - hardly a 'pro - tax' 
organisation - has decried this corrosive effect: -
'The constant promotion of these frequently artificial transactions breeds significant disrespect for the tax 
system, encouraging responsible corporate taxpayers to expect this type of activity to be the norm and to 
follow the lead of other taxpayers who have engaged in tax advantaged transactions. ,30 
6.3.4 Unfair Shifting a/the Tax Burden 
Impennissible tax avoidance has a tremendous impact upon the equity and fairness of 
the tax system.3l At its most basic level, it creates a 'fonn of subsidy for those paying 
their fair share of tax according to the intention of the law to those shirking their similar 
obligations. ,32 Taxpayers engaging in such impennissible tax avoidance have thus been 
seen as a particular aspect of the free rider problem.33 At a more systematic level, 
impennissible tax avoidance, particularly in the context of globalisation and hannful tax 
competition, may severely constrain the ability of governments to tax income from 
capital and other relatively mobile sources.34 These forces, in tum have tended to result 
in a shift of the tax burden to less mobile factors such as labour and consumption.35 At 
the same time, by eroding the tax base, impennissible tax avoidance exerts an artificial 
upward pressure on marginal rates. 
6.3.5 Increasing Complexity 
Often hann manifests itself in increasingly complex tax laws. This problem has two 
aspects: one, a proliferation of specific anti-avoidance measures that are enacted in 
response to particular schemes that are discovered on audit; the other, a tendency to try 
and pre-empt possible avoidance through increasingly complex and detailed legislation 
in the first instance. While this complexity may sometimes be self- defeating, it 
invariably increases the compliance burden upon all taxpayers. 
29The problem of Corporate Tax Shelters op. cit. n 19, at 12 
30Statement of Harold R. Handler, on behalf of the Tax Section, New York State Bar Association, 
Before the Committee on Finance (27 April 1999) at 2, 'quoted in The Problem of Corporate 
Tax Shelters', op.cit. n 19, at 3 
31 0ECD, International Tax Terms .,. op .cit. n 4 
32Ralph Final Report, op. cit. n5, at s.6.2 (c) 
33Waincymer, J The Australian Tax Avoidance Experience and Responses.' A critical Review 
In Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law, op. cit. n 17 at 256 
340ECD, Harmful Tax Competition. op. cit. n 17, at 23 
35 Avi-Yonah, RS Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State 
(2000), I 13Harvard L Review 1575, at 1578 
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6.3.6 Conclusion 
Institutions involved in designing such aggressive tax schemes intending to abuse or 
misuse the law and deprive the fiscus of its fair share of revenue, must desist from such 
schemes. The consequences of failure in this regard will be seriously heavy penalties 
and closure of businesses could result depending on the court's decisions if the 
transactions are found to have illegal means to avoid tax. Therefore, South Africa must 
tighten its' legislation and the law must be tougher than before. Some of the decisions 
made in previous judgements should be re-visited when a transaction involving tax 
avoidance is found, for example, the South African Revenue Service and the courts 
should not only rely on imposing heavier penalties, but rather come up with stronger 
remedies. 
7 LACK OF COMMERCIAL SUBSTANCE APPROACH 
7.1 Introduction 
The original abnormality factors generated a significant amount of comments in the 
past. In the case of companies, PA YE may be claimed for somebody who is a relative or 
extended family member who is not registered on the payroll of the company. This is 
purely a transaction with an element of tax avoidance in it. The current abnormality 
requirements have two fundamental weaknesses. Firstly, the tax world is not neatly 
divided into two types of arrangements, one for bona fide business transactions and the 
other for impermissible avoidance arrangements. To the contrary, promoters typically 
'hijack' elements that were developed for non-tax reasons. Secondly, this dynamic often 
gives impermissible avoidance arrangements an underserved semblance of normality. 
These weaknesses contribute directly to the practical problems that have been 
encountered under s 103(1). The Commissioner is often forced to procede on a case-by-
case basis despite the common features of many impermissible avoidance arrangements. 
In addition, expert testimony is often required to pierce the semblance of normality that 
is created by the use of 'normal' elements. Finally, as several commentators have noted, 
the lack of an objective yardstick continues to leave the abnormality requirement open 
to an 'everyone's doing it' defence. In the light of these comments, the revised proposal 
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would strengthen and expand the current abnormality requirement by adding a new 
element or test explicitly targeting arrangements that lack commercial substance.36 
Taking the above into account, the Act does not define what is normal or abnormal for 
the purpose of establishing whether the manner or means in which a transaction, 
operation or scheme has been entered into or carried out is normal, or whether the rights 
and obligations created are those which would normally be created between persons 
dealing at arm's length. The courts have therefore, in many cases involving tax 
avoidance been called upon to consider the question of normality and abnormality. The 
findings in these cases are important in giving guidance to those taxpayers and their 
advisors who are contemplating entering into tax avoidance schemes. This can also 
apply to taxpayers and advisors who wish to structure the schemes, so that there are no 
elements of abnormality which could result in the schemes failing with regard to the tax 
avoidance purpose. 
Many of the tax avoidance cases which have been heard by the courts since 1990 have 
resulted from the attempts by the Commissioner to attack the widespread increase in tax 
avoidance schemes after 1985. (See 15 supra). The latter cases in which decisions have 
been made on the question of abnormality, and which have been reported, are all cases 
which were heard in the Special Court for Hearing Income Tax Appeals. The findings in 
these later cases do not, therefore, create precedent as do the findings in cases heard at 
the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal level. It is interesting that amendments 
have however, been introduced into the Act and are apparently in response to some of 
the decisions in these cases heard in the Special Court. (See 15 supra). 
This new commercial substance element would apply whether or not an arrangement 
would be considered 'abnormal' under current law. As a guiding principle and general 
rule, a lack of commercial substance would encompass any avoidance arrangement that 
fails to have a substantial impact upon any parties -
• business or commercial risks, or 
• net cash flows, or 
36 Proposed section 80A(a)(ii) 
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• beneficial ownership of any asset involved in the avoidance arrangement, 
apart from any effect attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained, 
but for the provisions of the new GAAR.37 
The revised proposals would also identify five characteristics that are generally 
indicative of arrangements that lack commercial substance.38 These characteristics 
encompass situations in which-
• The legal or economic effect resulting from the avoidance arrangement as a 
whole is inconsistent with, or differs substantially from the legal form of its' 
individual steps; 
• The avoidance arrangement includes or involves -
Round- trip financing; 
An accommodating or tax indifferent party; 
Elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other 
without a substantial change in the economic position of anyone or more 
of the parties; or 
• There is an inconsistent characterisation of the avoidance arrangement for 
tax purposes by the parties. 
The list is non-exclusive and is intended to provide additional guidance in identifying 
avoidance arrangements that lack commercial substance. 
7.2 Examples of abusive avoidance schemes 
7.2.1 No mechanical definition or bright-line test 
Following a tremendous amount of study and critical analysis devoted to this topic 
internationally, there has been a growing realisation that a single mechanical definition 
of abusive avoidance schemes is simply not possible. Such schemes appear to create 
improper tax planning as the revenue authorities would be unable to set proper targets, 
and unable to estimate their spending. 
37 Proposed section 80C( 1) 
38 Proposed section 80C(2) 
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7.2.2 Common Characteristics 
However, there has been a growing recognition that many of the most abusive 
avoidance schemes share common attributes - what have sometimes been called the 
hallmarks or badges of avoidance. These characteristics include: 
• the lack of economic substance (usually resulting from pre-arranged circular or 
self-cancelling arrangements); 
• the use oftax-indifferent accommodating parties or special purpose entities; 
• unnecessary steps and complexity; 
• inconsistent treatment for tax and financial accounting purposes; 
• high transaction costs; and 
• fee variation clauses or contingent fee provisions.39 
Other characteristics could include significant marketing activities by promoters, which 
have been a serious issue, for example, both in Australia and the United States, and the 
involvement of taxpayers in activities outside their normal areas of expertise. Films and 
plantation schemes are typical examples of the latter, in South Africa. Schemes 
possessing most, if not all, of these characteristics are referred to generally as 'abusive 
avoidance schemes '. 
7.2.3 Lack of economic substance 
One of the most important characteristics of abusive avoidance schemes is the lack of 
economic substance. In many abusive avoidance schemes, the taxpayer purports to 
make a substantial investment. This investment however, is largely an illusion. Through 
various devices, the taxpayer remains insulated from virtually all economic risk, while 
creating a carefully crafted impression to the contrary. 
In any investment, risk and return are related - the greater the risk, the greater the 
return. As a consequence, in so far as most abusive avoidance schemes typically involve 
little or no economic risk, they typically offer little or no opportunity for pre-tax gain.4o 
Rather, the 'return' to the 'investor' takes the form of the significant tax benefits 
promised by the arrangement. In this manner, 'a negligible pre-tax profit is transformed 
39 See ITC 1496 (1990) 53 SATC 229 
4°Indeed, in many cases, the purported pre-tax profit is actually less than the transaction fees and 
costs. In other examples, the transactions actually produce pre-tax losses. 
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into a significant after-tax return ,41. Indeed, the mismatch between a limited (or non-
existent) potential for pre-tax profit and the promise of very significant tax benefits is 
often a good indicator of an abusive avoidance scheme. 
7.2.4 High transaction costs 
Given particularly, the complexity of many abusive avoidance schemes and the 
development and marketing costs often incurred by promoters, it is not surprising that 
fees tend to be extremely high. In a recent film scheme, for example, the fee paid to the 
promoter actually exceeded the amount that went to the film producer. In other 
financing transactions, fees can easily run into millions. 
7.2.5 Unnecessary steps and complexity 
Abusive avoidance schemes are often not accompanied by genuine commercial activity. 
There are several reasons for this. These schemes often require the completion of certain 
formalistic steps to claim the desired tax result. In so-called 'bare dominium' schemes, 
for example, promissory notes evidencing future rental obligations are typically 
discounted through a tax indifferent party in order to enable the financing party to avoid 
tax on the full amounts received (while the borrower in the transaction continues to 
claim deductions for the full amount of the 'rent'). Similarly, a complex structure may 
be used to disguise the true nature of a scheme or 'as a device to cloak the tax shelter 
transaction from detection. ,42 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
The legislation should be expanded and reinforce the existing abnormality requirement 
through the introduction of a new commercial substance element or test. Heavy 
penalties and other factors that will combat tax avoidance should be implemented to 
reduce or eradicate these schemes. Furthermore the taxpayer had to bear in mind the 
onus of proof under s 103(1). The taxpayer must at all time act against s 82 of the Act, 
when entering into a tax avoidance arrangement which means proof must always be 
provided when needed. Once this is shown, South African Revenue Service bears the 
onus of showing that all four requirements have been met, should South African 
41The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, op. cit. n 19, at 15 
42The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters op. cit. n 19, at16 
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Revenue Service wish to invoke the provisions of s 103(1) of the Act. With the advent 
of the new s 80A to 80L, the question of onus has been charged. 
If a transaction or an arrangement is found containing an element of tax-avoidance, the 
new provisions of s 80A(c)(ii) of the Act should be applied as this section is capable of 
reinforcing the modem approach to the interpretation of tax statutes.43 This implies that 
it will strengthen or support the modem approach. This begs the following question: 
Will s 80A(c)(ii) strengthens (increase) or merely support (maintain) the modem 
approach? In common law tradition, there are two broad approaches to the interpretation 
of statutes (which includes tax statutes), namely the traditional and the modem 
approach. In order to evaluate the ability of s 80A(c)(ii) to reinforce the modem 
approach, it will be necessary to construe the meaning of the phrase 'a misuse or abuse 
of the provisions.'44 For it to reinforce the modem approach, it is submitted the meaning 
of the phrase must prescribe such an approach. It will also be necessary to evaluate the 
scope of s 80A(c)(ii) in order to ascertain whether it is wide enough to reinforce the 
modem approach. 
7.3 Proposed Changes 
7.3.1 An objective purpose requirement 
The proposed amendments would change the purpose requirement to an objective test in 
accordance with the practice in other countries. In particular, the proposed amendment 
would require the determination to be made 'objectively by reference to the relevant 
facts and circumstances. ,45 The amendment is intended to preclude the anomalous 
results identified by RC Williams that could potentially arise under the current 
provisions.46 It is anticipated that it will be very difficult for a taxpayer to rebut the 
presumption of a 'tax avoidance' purpose in any case in which a tax effect has been 
established and the taxpayer has been unable to rebut a presumption of 'abnormality' 
arising under the proposed amendment to the abnormality requirement. 
43 Meditari Accountancy Research Vol. 17 No.2 2009 : 167-185 
44 Ibid. 
45 SARS: Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act 
No 58 of 1962), November 2005, at 44 
46 William, RC, op. cit. n 148, at 675 
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7.3.2 Application in the Alternative 
In many cases, there is often a threshold dispute in respect of the applicability of a 
specific provision. For example, given the complexity of many derivatives, an audit 
may well involve a very technical dispute as to whether or not a particular arrangement 
constitutes an instrument for the purpose of s 24J of the Act. At the same time, the 
arrangement may be so artificial and contrived that the application of s 103(1) may also 
be appropriate (in the event that the arrangement does avoid s 24J on technical 
grounds). Permitting the Commissioner to raise GAAR (s 80A to 80L) as an alternative 
basis for an assessment, after giving proper notice to the taxpayer, simply makes sense 
from the standpoint of administrative and judicial economy and would bring South 
Africa into in line with Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
7.3.3 Penalties 
Experience from other jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the Unites States, has shown that a significant portion of the tax avoidance problem 
is attributable to the aggressive marketing of abusive avoidance schemes by various 
promoters. At present, however, the Act does not contain any penalties specifically 
applicable to them. Given the lucrative fees involved and the extent to which promoters 
can protect themselves through devices like fee variation clauses, such penalties are an 
essential element of any effort to deter impermissible tax avoidance. In addition, 
separate amendments would also be proposed to introduce a new penalty that would be 
imposed in the event of a substantial understatement of income by a taxpayer. 
7.3.4 Implementation and Related Issues 
As noted above, it is anticipated that the Advance Tax Ruling System would be 
modified as it is phased in so as to permit taxpayers to obtain greater guidance and 
certainty in respect of the application of the new provisions. It is also anticipated that 
the Commissioner will develop and implement procedures to ensure their consistent and 
appropriate application. Changes to the 'reportable arrangement' rules would also be 
made in order to capture transactions embodying the factors giving rise to a 
presumption of abnormality. Finally, as noted above, these provisions may provide the 
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necessary and essential foundation for possible tax reform and simplification in the 
future. 
7.3.5 Conclusion 
The above proposed changes will be of good use to the Commissioner of the South 
African Revenue Service and if the proposed changes can be applied correctly and 
without bias, cases with a tax avoidance element will be presented less often both in the 
courts and to the South African Revenue Service. However, the honest, hard-working 
taxpayers of South Africa deserve better. The South African government and the group 
of experts must sit down and try to come up with a strategy to reward those taxpayers 
and this could be a step forward for the government to try to combat tax avoidance and 
even if not completely successful, a meaningful progress can be made out of this by 
encouraging others to come forward and do the right thing. 
8. SUBSTANCE VERSUS FORM APPROACH 
8.1 Introduction 
Tax is always based on the substance of a transaction, rather than its form. This means 
that ifthe written agreement between two persons (the form) is different from their true 
intention (the substance); tax is based on their true intention, because that is the real 
agreement. In the case of Zandberg v Van Zyl47 the court said: 
'Now, as a general rule, the parties to a contract express themselves in language calculated 
without subterfuge or concealment to embody the agreement at which they have arrived. They 
intend the contract to be exactly what it purports; and the shape which it assumes is what it 
should have. Not infrequently however (either to secure some advantage which otherwise the 
law would not give, or to escape some disability which otherwise the law would impose) the 
parties to a contract endeavour to conceal its real character. They call it by a name, or give it(s) 
shape, intended not to express but to disguise its true nature. And when the court is asked to 
decide any rights under such an agreement, it can only do so by giving effect to what the 
transaction really is; not what in form it purports to be. The maxim then applies plus valet quo 
agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. (What it says is that truth and not simulation will win the 
day - this is an unalterable rule and throughout life one experiences this axiom in action: 
whether in law, religion, politics or economics). But the words of the rule indicate its limitations. 
47 1910 AD 309 
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The court must be satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs 
from the simulated intention. For if the parties in fact mean that a contract shall have effect in 
accordance with its tenor, the circumstance that the same object might have been attained in 
another way will not necessarily make the arrangement other than what it purports to be.' 
It may be that where the substance of a transaction is different from its form, this 
amounts at least to tax avoidance. In either case South African Revenue Service will not 
have to apply anti-avoidance rules, it will merely tax the true transaction. 
'In another case, that of Erf 318311 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1996 (3) SA 942 (A), 58 SATC 
229): Company 1 owned vacant land. Its holding company wanted to build a furniture factory on 
the land. If the land was leased to another company within the group with the requirement that it 
build the factory on the land, the lessee would have written the cost of the building off, over the 
period of lease, as a leasehold improvement. The lessor would have been taxed on the value of 
the improvements in terms of paragraph (h) of the gross income definition. They therefore 
devised the following plan -
The lessor let the land to a pension fund which was a tax-exempt entity. The pension fund was 
not obliged to build the factory on the land. The pension fund sub-let the land to the lessee and 
there was an obligation placed on the lessee to pay a lease premium to the pension fund, which 
would enable the pension fund to build the factory. The lessee (at that time) could not write off 
the cost of the leasehold improvements under section 11 (g) of the Income Tax Act, as the 
pension fund was not taxed. However, section 11 (f) allowed a deduction of a lease premium 
even if the sub-lessor was not taxed. The section has since been amended'. [Taken from the facts 
in the case of Erf 318311 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1996 (3) SA 942 (a), 58 SATC 229]. 
As the Commissioner could not tax the pension fund, the agreements were looked at and 
someone asked the question - if the pension fund could require the lessee to pay a lease 
premium, then wasn't there really an agreement between the lessor and the pension fund 
that the factory had to be built? The court held that there was a real likelihood that there 
was an unexpressed agreement that the lessor would be able to require the pension fund 
to build the factory. It said that the written agreement probably did not reflect the 
parties' full intentions. Therefore, the lease between the lessor and the pension fund, in 
substance required the pension fund to build the factory. In the circumstances the 
Revenue Service was entitled to apply paragraph (h) of the gross income definition to 
tax the lessor on the value of the factory as a leasehold improvement. 
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One could say that this was a tax avoidance scheme, but it was not necessary to apply 
any anti-avoidance rule to tax it. The scheme did not go as far as being tax evasion, 
because the lease agreement was not fraudulent. The court merely said that it was 
probable that there were extra requirements which were not specifically referred to in 
the lease agreement, and that all the requirements had to be looked at together to work 
out the parties' overall intentions. 
Another case involving a transaction entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the 
purpose of avoiding, postponing or reducing the liability for any tax, duty or levy under 
the Act or under any other law administered by South African Revenue Service (which 
s 103(1) defined as being a 'tax benefit' was the Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
Conhage (Pty) Ltct8 , this case stipulates the transaction that was entered into in order to 
avoid tax in the form of sale and leaseback agreements. 
'A taxpayer entering into two sets of agreements with a bank and in form each set comprised a 
sale and leaseback of some of its manufacturing plant and equipment. The true nature and 
substance of such agreements was whether such agreements were simulated transactions - the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue contended that, despite the form of the agreements, the 
taxpayer did not sell and lease back its equipment, but in substance borrowed the purchase price 
from the bank. The question was whether the Commissioner for Inland Revenue had correctly 
invoked s 103(1) of the Act? It was held that the evidence that parties had every intention of 
entering into agreements of sale and leaseback and of putting the agreements into effect had not 
been contradicted. The special court had not erred in finding that there was not sufficient reason 
to doubt the authenticity of the agreements at issue. Furthermore, it was held that it was by no 
means unusual to find provisions in a sale and leaseback which did not typically appear in a 
contract of purchase and sale or in a contract of lease. Although a sale and leaseback comprises 
an agreement of sale as well as an agreement of lease, it must be treated as one composite 
transaction' . 
8.2 Examples of abusive avoidance schemes and proposed changes 
The same principles to be applied under this topic were discussed above when dealing 
with the lack of commercial substance approach. 
48 61 SATC 391 
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9. SECTION 80A TO 80L OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, REVISED GAAR 
9.1 General 
As mentioned, the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was embodied in s 103(1) of 
the Act. Essentially, for the GAAR to apply, four requirements had to be satisfied (See 
discussion on page 13 supra). 
With regard to the 'abnormality' requirement, it was interpreted by the courts on a 
number of occasions, and it could be quite difficult for the South African Revenue 
Service to prove that an abnormality existed (the burden of proof in this case being on 
the South African Revenue Service). But what really weakened the s 103(1) 
irretrievably and raised question marks concerning the Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1996 
(3) SA 942 (a), 58 SATe 229 was the Conhage case,49 which essentially denied the 
application of the s 103(1) to any inserted step or part of a composite transaction, even 
though the inserted step or part was solely tax-motivated, as long as the entire 
transaction was commercially motivated, i.e. not motivated by tax reasons. 
As the result of the above, GAAR proposed six changes, where it is believed that this will 
strengthen and tighten any loophole that may be in existence: 
• Firstly, rather than testing whether the purpose of the scheme was solely or 
mainly to obtain a tax benefit by looking at the taxpayer's subjective intent, it 
was proposed that the purpose of the scheme be tested objectively by reference 
to the relevant facts and circumstances. 
• Secondly, because of the difficulties caused by the abnormality requirement, it 
was proposed that the legislation include a non-exclusive list of factors which 
would be used in determining abnormality. The proposal also stated that, if any 
of those factors were present, there was a rebuttable presumption of 
abnormality. The list of 'indicia or indicators' included the presence of a 
circular flow of cash or assets, the participation of a tax-indifferent party, the 
presence of offsetting or self-cancelling steps, and the absence of a reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit. 
49 CIR v Conhage (Pty) Limited [1994] 4 SA 1149 (SCA); 61 SATC 391 
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• Thirdly, to counter the effect of the Conhage decision, it was proposed that the 
new legislation apply to the scheme as a whole as well as to any step therein or 
part thereof. 
• Fourthly, contrary to the opinion in relation to the existing GAAR, the new GAAR 
could be applied in the alternative to other legislation. 
• Fifthly, in contrast to the existing GAAR, which could be applied where the sole 
or main purpose of the scheme was to obtain a tax benefit, the new GAAR would 
apply where the sole or one of the main purposes was to obtain a tax benefit 
(the grammatical difficulties arising from this formulation gave rise to much 
discussion). 
• Finally, and most controversially, it was proposed that penalties be imposed on 
both the promoters of a scheme and the taxpayers who participate in it. 
Under the GAAR, there were also some responses from the South African Revenue 
Service and the Treasury, some of the more pertinent responses, particularly in relation 
to the controversial areas, are summarised below: 
• Much criticism was levelled against the indicia of abnormality, one of the 
criticisms being that a circular flow of cash or assets was very common, without 
in any way being sinister (for example, the mere fact that a loan is advanced and 
then repaid involves a circular flow of funds). Also criticised was the wide 
definition of 'tax indifferent party', which could include an innocent special 
purpose vehicle in a transaction or even, literally interpreted, a new company 
formed to buy a business. The South African Revenue Service indicated that it 
was not unsympathetic to these concerns and, indeed, while the principles found 
their way into the legislation, their scope was narrowed down somewhat. 
• Concern was expressed that there would be a lack of guidance as to how South 
African Revenue Service intended to interpret the legislation and also that 
different branch offices of the South African Revenue Service might interpret 
and apply GAAR differently. Consideration was also given to centralising the 
decision to apply GAAR by a committee at the head office of the South African 
Revenue Service in order to ensure its consistent application. (There is, however, 
nothing in the legislation requiring this.) 
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• Generally, vociferous opposition was expressed against the presumption of 
abnormality and, while the presumption was defended, the South African 
Revenue Service stated that it appreciated the concerns that had been raised. At 
the end of the day, the presumption of abnormality did not find its way into the 
legislation. 
• Another area of concern was that the 'purpose' requirement (i.e. that the sole or 
main purpose of the scheme [to obtain a tax benefit] was to be determined 
objectively) in effect nullified the subjective element and, in any event, was 
contrary to what the courts had previously stated on the matter50 because it had 
the result that there was no difference between the purpose of the scheme and its 
effect (the latter being one of the other four requirements). Once again, this was 
defended quite vociferously, but at the end of the day, the test was left as a 
subjective purpose test. 5 I 
Moreover, the South African Revenue Service dismissed criticism of the attempt to 
change the test from the 'sole or one of the main purposes'. The South African Revenue 
Service also dismissed, as being on 'a somewhat lighter note', the criticisms levelled 
against the grammatical difficulties in interpreting the test. Despite this, the legislation 
continues to retain the expression 'sole or main purpose'. 
The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was introduced mainly to target the 'most 
serious elements' of schemes devised purely for the avoidance of taxation. This rule 
will be supported by an enhanced system of required reporting known as 'reportable 
arrangements' to give the government an early detection system. In real terms, these 
schemes cost the fiscus billions in tax revenue and that money can be much better spent 
for society'S benefit elsewhere. The new rules will also primarily target businesses and 
high net-worth individuals who can afford tax consultants. No doubt there will be a 
great deal written about these provisions in the months and years to come, as taxpayers 
and their advisors grapple with the problem of its interpretation, in the absence of 
specific case law on the new GAAR. 
50 SIR v Gallagher, 1978 (2) SA 463 A; 40 SATe 39 
51 Sec 103 
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The GAAR, by its nature, operates in tension with this notion. It imposes limits upon the 
extent to which an 'ordering of affairs' is to be respected for tax purposes. This rule 
comes as a relief to the poor, because they cannot afford to pay for tax avoidance 
advice, and as a result end up paying the major portion of the tax burden. Hopefully, the 
results will bring an eventual reduction in tax rates for all South Africans. The new 
General Anti-Avoidance Rule will serve as an income producing tool in both South 
Africa and other countries, it will boost the economy, help to reduce government 
borrowings, improve the unemployment rate and shrink criminal offences. Everyone 
will be paying hislher fair share of taxes and contributing towards the national fiscus. 
Short-term revenue loss, which is the most important harm caused by tax avoidance 
schemes, having been obviated. 
9.2 The Introduction of the GAAR 
9.2.1 The role ofthe GAAR 
It is equally important to emphasise what a GAAR is not. It is not a provision to facilitate 
criminal charges. In addition, a GAAR is not, and should not become a substitute for well 
drafted and well designed legislation. The GAAR nevertheless reflects a fundamental 
recognition that even the best drafted, best designed tax legislation cannot anticipate 
every possible nuance and circumstance that may arise, let alone every scheme that may 
later be devised in response to it. 52 It will enable both the South African Revenue 
Service and the courts to interpret the provisions less harshly as far as taxpayers are 
concerned. This was described as the most powerful tool/legislation developed to get rid 
of uncertainties, where doubts that emerged when a decision has to be made on a case 
involving avoidance. The GAAR was developed to give the courts and the South African 
Revenue Service a clear understanding of any transaction incorporating an element of 
avoidance within that transaction and also to corne up with a precise decision that would 
satisfy both parties. The GAAR would target the 'most serious elements' of schemes 
devised purely for the avoidance of taxation, and would be supported by an enhanced 
system of required reporting known as 'reportable arrangements' to give the 
government an early detection system. If South Africa can get the wording right in this 
new GAAR, then these schemes will corne to an end. 
52Cooper, GS. Conflicts, Challenge and Choices - The Rule of Law and Anti-Avoidance Rules 
in Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law, op. cit. n 7 at 13 
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9.2.2 Application of the GAAR 
The application of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (s 80A to 80L) to impennissible 
tax avoidance 'schemes' may help to stem the tide of short - tenn revenue loss. The 
GAAR itself is a revenue raising measure. It is intended to protect the tax base 
established by Parliament, not to expand it.53 This protection may in tum provide the 
necessary and essential foundation for any future tax refonn and simplification, 
particularly in the area of business tax. The provisions of the new GAAR present a 
challenge to both taxpayers and their advisers as they attempt to detennine exactly how 
the new legislation should be interpreted and how it will apply. Parliament was well 
aware of the fact that there was a tax gap in previous years based on the old s 103(1). 
The GAAR no doubt came as a welcome relief to our legislators as there should now be 
more revenue to be collected and distributed and the taxpayers will not find any space to 
try and arrange their tax affairs in a manner that will avoid tax. 'As the GAAR was 
developed mainly to protect the liability for the income tax established under the other 
provisions of the legislation,54 and as the new s 80A to 80L are fairly strict, the courts 
are likely to interpret the provisions less harshly as far as the taxpayers are concerned'. 
9.2.3 The lack of commercial substance 
The GAAR defines 'lack of commercial substance' as meanmg that the avoidance 
arrangement would result in a significant tax benefit for a party, but the arrangement 
does not have a significant effect upon either the business risks or net cash flows of that 
party (other than the effect attributable to the tax benefit). These are very broad, and 
even vague, concepts. The legislation does, however give a list of indications of where a 
lack of commercial substance would exist, (but the legislation is at pains to point out 
that the list is not exhaustive). The first is where the legal substance of the avoidance 
arrangement as a whole is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from the legal fonn 
of its separate steps. The entire area of legal substance versus legal fonn is a complex 
area of the law and one that has been referred to and dealt with on a number of 
occasions by the South African courts. 55 What is new here is that the legislation 
53Joffe H Never mind the technicalities of tax, let's hear the philosophy, Business Day (12 April 
2005), at 8 
54 CIR v BNZ Investments [2002] 1 NZLR 450 
55 Mazansky, Ernest, The Duke of Westminster Still Lives in South Africa (But Is Very Careful 
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attempts to import into South African law the effect of certain decisions in the United 
Kingdom56 on the basis that, while the legal substance of each separate step conforms 
with the legal form, the legal substance of the avoidance arrangement as a whole does 
not. Once again, it will be up to the courts to determine the scope and meaning of this 
provision (and similarly, it is likely to be some years before this happens). 
Another indication is the inclusion or presence of: 
• Round- trip financing; 
• an accommodating or tax-indifferent party; or 
• elements that have the effect of off-setting or cancelling each other. 
The offsetting or self-cancelling aspects are also concepts imported into South African 
law from decisions of the UK and US courts. These aspects, unlike the other two, are 
not dealt with further in the legislation. 
9.2.4 The effect of avoiding tax versus a tax benefit 
The effect of avoiding tax can increase the country's debt and force it to borrow funds 
from other countries, the interest that would be paid and the effect on the inflation rate 
would be high and that would tend to move the economy towards a recession scenario. 
Short-term revenue loss would also be the most immediate and obvious problem. The 
un-employment rate would go up leading to increased crime and the closure of 
companies which would impact negatively on the country's economy. Other countries 
interest in investing in South Africa would be reduced, because it would be perceived to 
lack control over its tax morality and tax laws. The effect of avoiding tax would also 
hinder the overall development of South Africa and hamper its efforts to alleviate 
poverty. In terms of tax benefit, the following points stand out in the revised GAAR: 
• an impermissible avoidance arrangement means any avoidance arrangement 
described in s 80A; 
• an avoidance arrangement means any arrangement that, but for the provisions of 
this part results in a tax benefit; 
When He Crosses the Road), 59 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 3 (2005), 
at 116 
56 WT Ramsey Ltd v IRC, [1981] ALL ER 865; and Furniss v Dawson, [1984] AC 474 
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• a tax benefit includes any avoidance, postponement, or reduction of any liability 
for tax; 
• tax includes any tax, levy, or duty imposed by the Act or any other Act 
administered by the Commissioner 
In South Africa, if we are all honest with our tax affairs, the tax paid to South African 
Revenue Service will also benefit us as a nation, because the more that people pay their 
fair share of taxes to South African Revenue Service, the more this will result in 
eventual reduction in tax rates, State coffers would fill up, leading to reduced 
government borrowing. This would come as a relief to honest taxpayers, as most of 
them want to lift the country's economy, for the creation of jobs and other projects that 
are still in the pipe-line for the government to pursue. 
9.2.5 The purpose requirements 
Another area of concern was that the 'purpose' requirement (i.e. that the sole or main 
purpose of the scheme [to obtain a tax benefit] was determined objectively) in effect 
nullified the subjective element and, in any event was contrary to what the courts had 
previously stated on the matter,S7 because it had the result that there was no difference 
between the purpose of the scheme and its effect (the latter being one of the other four 
requirements). Once again, this was defended quite vociferously, the end result being 
that the test was left as a subjective test. 58 In most other countries, such as UK; Canada 
etc, the courts and their authorities, have come to the opposite conclusion in interpreting 
legislation which referred to 'the purpose of an arrangement.' The principle that has 
been established is that, it is difficult to prove the intention ofthe taxpayer. 
The legislation must be very clear on this one as most taxpayers will enter into a 
transaction in both ways. It can be entered into or carried out for the sole or main 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit or unless and until the party obtaining a tax benefit 
proves that, reasonably considered in light of the relevant facts and circumstances, 
obtaining a tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the avoidance arrangement. 
In terms of s 80A - 'an arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement in that 
57 SIR v Gallagher, 1978 (2) SA 463 A; 40 SATe 39. 
58 Sec 103 
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its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit'. Have the ground rules changed? 
The question is then; must the courts now apply an objective test? Rather, the courts 
have ruled that the onus lies with the Commissioner to prove that the presence of all the 
requirements for the application of s 103(1), subject to the proviso that once the tax 
avoidance effect of the transaction had been proven by the Commissioner, the onus then 
shifts to the taxpayer to prove that the taxpayer's main purpose was not to avoid tax.59 
The Commissioner can also rely on s 80H which empowers him to apply the provisions 
of the GAAR to steps in or part of an arrangement, and also s 80G(2) provides that the 
purpose of a step in or part of an avoidance arrangement may be different from a 
purpose attributable to the avoidance arrangement as a whole. Most probably the 
legislature was out to destroy the principle that had been established by the courts in 
cases like Conhage, to the effect that where a transaction, operation, or scheme was 
entered into for an overriding non-tax reason, the Commissioner could not apply s 
103(1) to any steps in or parts of that transaction, operation, or scheme which were tax 
driven. 
9.2.6 The tainted element 
The tainted element is one of the tools that both the taxpayers and their advisors used to 
design such avoidance arrangements. The provision of s 80C of the Income Tax Act 
(the Act) was no doubt intended to form the heart of the new general anti-avoidance 
rule. It is however poorly and ambiguously drafted, and requires urgent 'by-pass 
surgery' in order to bring about further clarity. 
9.2.7 The legal substance of the avoidance agreement 
The first characteristic is that the legal substance or effects of the avoidance 
arrangement as a whole is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from the legal form 
of its individual steps. It is necessary to obtain clarity about the nature of this test. For a 
start, it must not be confused with the familiar substance-versus-form issue as 
considered, for example in Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR.6o The well-known substance-over-
form exercise explained in the Relier case must indeed always be applied in tax cases 
59 CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SeA) 
6°[1997] (SeA), 60 SATe 1 
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involving potential tax avoidance arrangements. But that exercise must be carried out 
and completed before even beginning to consider whether the provisions of the general 
anti-avoidance rule apply to the arrangement in question. The substance-over-form rule 
may well require the stripping away of the form of a sham transaction and the exposing 
of its true substance. The point is however that the provisions of the general anti-
avoidance rule are to be applied only to its true rights and obligations that have been 
identified after all substance-versus-form issues have been resolved. 
The test as postulated in s 80C(2)(a) must accordingly refer to a different comparison. It 
seems to require that a comparison be made between the following: 
• on the other hand, the 'legal substance or effect' of the whole scheme, and 
• on the other hand, the 'legal form' of the individual steps. 
This is confusing, because the word' legal' is used in relation to either the substance or 
effect of the avoidance arrangement as a whole, and in relation to the form of its 
individual steps. However, in common and also in judicial parlance the word' legal' is 
usually used to draw a contrast between the legal effect of an arrangement and its' 
economic or commercial effect. 
By way of example, in Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v HM Inspector of 
Taxes,61 the court interpreted a provision in the United Kingdom legislation that referred 
to the cost to the taxpayer of an asset, by applying the legal meaning of the word 'cost' 
and not it's economic meaning. In the result, the court allowed the taxpayer to deduct 
the cost price of machinery expressed to be payable by the taxpayer in terms of a written 
contract forming part of a sale and lease-back scheme. Even though there was no 
economic cost to the taxpayer once the economic effect of the whole scheme was taken 
into account. In short, the test set out in s 80C(2)(a) would have made obvious sense if 
it had referred to the situation in which 'the (economic effect) of an avoidance 
arrangement as a whole is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from the legal 
(effect) of its individual steps'. 
61 [2005] STC 1 
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The wording would also have accorded with the object of the exercise, namely to 
detennine whether the arrangement as a whole had commercial substance. But it does 
not read that way, so the question must still be asked: what is meant by the tenn 'the 
legal substance or effect of the avoidance arrangement as a whole is inconsistent with, 
or differs significantly from the legal fonn of its individual steps'? Some might argue 
that the test is meaningless because the 'legal substance or effect' of the avoidance 
arrangement as a whole can never amount to anything more or less than the totality of 
the 'legal nature' of its individual steps. 
9.2.8 Lack of commercial substance - round- trip financing 
Round-trip financing includes any avoidance arrangement III which the following 
occurs: 
• funds are transferred between or among the parties; and 
• the transfer results directly or indirectly in a tax benefit, and it significantly 
reduces, offsets or eliminates any business risk incurred by any party to the 
avoidance arrangement. 
Anticipating a factual attack on these tests, the legislation states that no regard may be 
had to-
(a) whether or not the round tripped amounts can be traced to funds 
transferred to or received by any other party 
(b) the timing or sequence in which the amounts are transferred or 
received or 
(c) the means by or manner in which the amounts are transferred or 
received 
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9.2.9 Lack of commercial substance - the presence of an accommodating or 
tax indifferent party 
The third 'indicator' of an arrangement lacking commercial substance is the presence of 
an 'accommodating or tax-indifferent party'. The provision of s 80E(2) provides that 
'[a] party to an avoidance arrangement is an accommodating or tax-indifferent party if-
(a) any party amount derived by the party in connection with the avoidance 
arrangement is either-
• not subject to normal tax; or 
• significantly offset either by any expenditure or loss incurred by the party in 
connection with that avoidance arrangement or any other assessed loss of that 
party; and 
(b) either: 
• as a direct or indirect result of the participation of that party an amount that 
would have-
(aa) been included in the gross income (including the recoupment of any 
amount) or receipts or accruals of a capital nature or another party would 
be included in the gross income or receipts or accruals of a capital nature 
of that party; or 
(bb) constituted a non-deductible expenditure or loss in the hands of another 
party would be treated as a deductible expenditure by that other party; or 
(cc) constituted revenue in the hands of another party would be treated as 
capital by that other party; or 
(dd) gives rise to taxable income to another party that would either not be 
included in gross income or be exempt from normal tax; or 
(ee) the participation of that party directly or indirectly involves a 
prepayment by any other party. 62 
62 SARS, Draft Guide to Reportable Arrangements 
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At least in this instance one can discern the possibility, but not the certainty of a 
relevant connection, albeit tenuous between the status of the taxpayer and the fact that 
there is an accommodating party involved in an arrangement to which the taxpayer is 
also a party. Yet, on closer examination, it becomes apparent that it would be 
impermissible to draw any inference against the taxpayer from the mere fact that they 
are an accommodating party figure in the arrangement, the reason is that the fact that an 
arrangement includes an accommodating party tells one nothing about the quantum of 
any economic benefit derived by the taxpayer. 
An accommodating or tax-indifferent party (accommodating party) to an avoidance 
arrangement is one who participates where the following alternative circumstances 
exist: 
• the amount received by the accommodating party is not subject to normal tax in 
South Africa or is significantly offset by any expenditure or loss; or 
• because of the party's participation 
(a) something that would have been taxable in someone else's hands 
becomes capital in the accommodating party's hands 
(b) something that would have been non-deductible in someone else's hands 
becomes deductible in the accommodating party's hands 
(c) something that would have been taxable in someone else's hands is 
exempt in the accommodating party's; or 
(d) the accommodating party's participation directly or indirectly involves a 
prepayment by someone else. 
There are two exclusions to prevent ordinary business transactions from being caught 
within the net. The first is, if the potential accommodating party is taxable in another 
country in an amount equal to at least two thirds of the tax that would have been 
payable in South Africa. The second is, if the potential accommodating party continues 
to engage directly in substantive active trading activities in connection with the 
avoidance arrangement for a period of at least 18 months and the activities are 
attributable to a proper place of business (equivalent to a foreign business establishment 
as defined in s 9D of the Act, which is the Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) 
legislation, if it were located outside South Africa). 
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9.2.10 Lack of commercial substance - the arrangements include elements that have 
the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other 
The offsetting or self-cancelling aspects are also concepts imported into South African 
law from decisions of the UK and US courtS.63 In terms of s 80C(2)(b)(iii), an 
arrangement which includes 'elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling 
each other', indicates a lack of commercial substance. The self-neutralising mechanism 
described here will be readily recognised as a feature of the type of tax avoidance 
scheme considered by the court64 . In fact, if one runs one finger down the list of 
characteristics which are in s 80C to indicate a lack of commercial substance, it is 
apparent that they are all features of a specific type of tax avoidance scheme, namely, 
the type of scheme in which a party without any economic interest is interposed in an 
arrangement so as to procure a tax benefit for the 'real' parties. 
Perhaps some of the problems besetting the new general anti-avoidance rule might have 
been avoided if this type of scheme had been countered by way of a specific-anti-tax 
avoidance provision in the Act, rather by way of inclusion in the general anti-avoidance 
rule. To sum up the appraisal of s 80C and its appendages, it would seem that the 
drafters have linked together in s 80C(1) and s 80C(2) two types of tests for a 
commercial substance that are incompatible. In the aggregate s 80C is fraught with 
confusion. 
There is probably only one way to handle a situation such as this, at least until these 
issues have been resolved. The logical and jurisprudential anomalies should be ignored 
and the arrangement under consideration should be evaluated as if s 80C( 1) and s 80C 
(2) postulated separate and distinct tests. If the arrangement fails either, 
• the s 80C(1) test, or 
• anyone of the guidelines, or whatever they are as described in s 80C 
(2), it should be assumed that the arrangement is at risk of a successful 
attack by the commissioner. 
63 WT Ramsey Ltd v IRe, supra note 13, and Knetsch v United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) 
64 Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson (1984) 1 All ER 530 (HL) 
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9.2.11 Reportable Arrangements 
An 'arrangement' is widely defined in s 80T to include any transaction, operation or 
scheme; interrelated transactions might be considered as forming part of a larger scheme 
and falling within this definition. The onus is on the participant to an arrangement to 
determine whether it needs to be disclosed to South African Revenue Service and to 
prove on the balance of probabilities that the transaction operation or scheme does not 
constitute an 'arrangement' as defined. Whether a transaction, which forms part of a 
larger scheme, is disclosed to South African Revenue Service and the remainder of the 
scheme will also need to be disclosed.65 
Conversely, where the wider scheme is disclosed to South African Revenue Service, the 
component parts do not have to be so disclosed. When in doubt, the participant should 
disclose the transaction or part of a scheme to avoid a potential exposure to the Rl 
million non-disclosure penalty. 
When dealing with these kinds of arrangement, one must also bear in mind the purpose 
of the legislature in respect to 'reportable arrangements'. One of the purposes is to 
provide an early warning system of potential tax-aggressive products being 
implemented in South Africa. These would enable South African Revenue Service to 
respond to any kind of identified abuse. Responses to such products may vary and could 
include legislative proposals as well as challenging the transaction in terms of the 
current law. 
In essence, s 76A provided that every company or trust which derived any tax benefit in 
terms of a 'reportable arrangement' had to disclose that arrangement to the 
Commissioner within sixty (60) days after the date that any amount was first received 
by, or accrued to, any person or was paid or actually incurred by any person in terms of 
that arrangement. The period could also be extended by no more than 60 days if the 
Commissioner was satisfied that reasonable grounds existed for the delay in reporting 
such an arrangement. 66 
65SARS, 31 March 2010 : Draft Guide to Reportable Arrangements 
66Sec 76A of the Income Tax Act 
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There are also broad overviews on the 'reportable arrangement' provisions available as 
guides on when and how an arrangement should be reported. The provisions mostly rely 
on objectively determined characteristics to establish whether an arrangement IS a 
'reportable arrangement', as defined. These characteristics together with the 'tax 
benefit' requirement are applied to filter out arrangements to be disclosed to South 
African Revenue Service. The purpose of the disclosure requirement is to notify South 
African Revenue Service of a transaction or transactions that have the main objective, or 
one of the main objectives, to obtain a tax benefit. However, merely because a 
transaction is reportable does not mean that it is automatically deemed an impermissible 
avoidance arrangement for the purposes of GAAR nor does it have any effect on the 
substantive consideration of normal tax liability by South African Revenue Service. 
/ 
The legislation aims to assist participants and promoters in determining whether an 
arrangement should be disclosed to South African Revenue Service for the purposes of 
the 'reportable arrangement' provisions and hence ensures greater certainty. In terms of 
the provisions, a distinction is made between two types of reportable arrangements, 
namely, -
• those that require that a tax benefit be derived [s 80M(1)]; and 
• those that are presumed to give effect to a tax benefit and which are listed in s 
80M(2). 
The test whether a tax benefit is derived, or will be derived, or is assumed to be derived 
as contemplated in s 80M(1), is a balanced test based on an objective calculation. 
Unique circumstances relating to the participants to the arrangement may in some 
instances be taken into account. Certain arrangements are specifically excluded from the 
definition of 'reportable arrangement' (see s 80N). The exclusion list was expanded in 
Government Notice No.384 of 1 April 2008. In terms of the notice, an arrangement is 
specifically excluded if the tax benefit that is, or will be derived, or is assumed to be 
derived does not exceed Rl million or if such tax benefit is not the main or one of the 
main benefits obtained. An objective test is applied in determining whether a tax benefit 
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constitutes one of the main benefits and the subjective purpose test of the taxpayer is not 
taken into account. 67 
In order to determine whether an arrangement IS a 'reportable arrangement', the 
following tests need to be applied -
An arrangement is reportable if it falls under one of the following two categories, which 
are set out in s 80M: 
• Firstly, 'specific arrangements', which are those arrangements deemed 
reportable by the legislature, as set out in ss 80M(2) 
• Secondly, 'generic arrangements', meaning arrangements that result in a tax 
benefit and meet any of the other requirements in ss 80M(1) 
The specific 'reportable arrangements' [s 80M(2)], test whether the arrangement falls 
under any of the following categories: 
• hybrid equity instruments; 
• hybrid debt instruments; 
• arrangements identified by notice in the Government Gazette which are likely to 
result in an undue tax benefit 
• 'Generic' reportable arrangements [s 80M(1)], which dwell much on the 
arrangement which does not fall under any of the abovementioned categories, 
but gives rise to a tax benefit, namely, any avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any tax liability, which is calculated as follows: 
• objectively compare the situation where no arrangement is entered into with the 
situation existing following the implementation of the arrangement (tax benefits 
determined over the anticipated life-span of the arrangement); or 
• compare total tax benefits (over the anticipated life-span of the arrangement and 
discounted at a reasonable discount rate) derived from the arrangement with the 
tax benefit that would have been derived from a reasonable comparable 
transaction of the same or similar nature. 
67 Sec 80M(l) and Sec 80M(2) of the Income Tax Act 
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The assumed tax treatment of an arrangement is, generally speaking apparent from the 
agreements as well as from the financial model (if any) which accompanies the 
arrangement. The financial model itself usually offers the most accurate reflection of 
what the tax benefits are assumed to be, or what they will be if not challenged by South 
African Revenue Service. There is normally consent among the parties as to what these 
assumed tax benefits are, as they sign off on the agreements which underpin the model. 
There does not seem to be much room for debate as to what is meant by the tax benefits 
'assumed by a participant', where a variation from the assumed tax benefits in any event 
has the potential of triggering an adjustment in the pricing of the arrangement in 
question. 
The term 'tax benefit' is broadly defined to include any avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any liability for tax. Even if the arrangement only defers a tax liability, this 
is sufficient for s 80M to 80T to apply. For the purposes of the 'reportable arrangement' 
provisions, the 'tax benefit' must be at least Rl million, while further filters are applied 
which may result in the arrangement not being required to be disclosed in terms of the 
provisions. This definition does not introduce any new concepts and substantially agrees 
with the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Appeal68 , 'has the effect of 
avoiding or postponing liability for the payment of any tax, or reducing the amount 
thereof, as set out in the predecessor to the GAAR (s 103). 
In Hicklin, supra, at 193, it was held that 'liability' in s 103(1), does not refer to an 
accrued or existing one, for such liability cannot be avoided by any transaction, (see 
CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 (AD). The Supreme Court of Appeal held in Smith v CIR69 
that the liability in question is an anticipated liability. It was further held that the 
ordinary, natural meaning of the term 'tax benefit' must prevail; to avoid, escape or 
prevent an anticipated liability. 
There are certain methods used to calculate a tax benefit, namely, the comparative 
method and the control transaction method. These methods are listed below: 
68 CIR v Louw 45 SATC 113 and Hicklin v SIR 41 SATC 179 
69 1964 (1) SA 324 (A) 
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(a) The Comparative method 
The South African Revenue Service favours the comparative method for determining a 
tax benefit. This test compares the situation where the parties did not enter into an 
arrangement, that is, they did nothing with the position following the implementation of 
an arrangement and discounted the tax benefit over the period of the transaction to the 
date of the first cash flow of the arrangement, unless the participant is able to prove a 
more reasonable alternative method. 
(b) The Control transaction method 
The control transaction method compares the tax benefit obtained by the arrangement in 
question with the benefit that would have been obtained by a comparable transaction not 
considered to have been entered into to achieve a tax benefit. If the participants, or 
South African Revenue Service, wish to rely on the control transaction method to prove 
that a tax benefit had not, or had been attained, they must justify why the proposed 
method would be more appropriate than the comparative method. 
No substantive tax consequences attach to the calculation of the tax benefit for the 
purposes of applying the 'reportable arrangement' provisions, other than to establish 
whether the Rl million penalty should be imposed for non-disclosure. The test is not 
applied for the same purpose as the test contained in the GAAR. Participants aggrieved 
by the R 1 million penalty have recourse to several remedies. If a participant does not 
derive, nor anticipates deriving a tax benefit from the arrangement, but another 
participant to the same arrangement derives a tax benefit, then both participants will 
have a potential disclosure obligation. To prevent exposure to a Rl million penalty, all 
participants to such an arrangement should consider not only their own, but the other 
parties' tax benefits also. If a tax benefit exists, see whether the arrangement meets any 
of the following requirements: 
(a) the arrangement provides for interest, finance, costs, fees or other 
charges that are partly or wholly dependent on the assumptions relating 
to the tax treatment of that arrangement 
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(b) It contains any of the characteristics which are substantially similar to 
the indicators of a lack of commercial substance under GAAR, including 
the presence of -
• round- trip financing; 
• an accommodating or tax indifferent party; and 
• elements which offset or cancel each other: 
(c) It is or will be disclosed by any participant as a financial liability for the 
purposes of General Accounting Accepted Practice (GAAP), but not for 
income tax purposes; 
(d) it does not result in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any 
participant; or 
( e) It results in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any 
participant that is less than the value of those tax benefits to 
that participant on a present value basis. 
The question would then be what would happen if the reportable arrangement is 
excluded in terms of s 80N, or the tax benefit is less than Rl million, or is the tax 
benefit the main or one of the main benefits of the arrangement or is it a stand-alone 
arrangement that is unlikely to be tax driven? Then the answer would be that it must 
not be reported, but if the total tax benefit is more than Rl million, the arrangement 
must be reported. Stand-alone arrangements that are unlikely to be tax driven, such as 
ordinary loans, leases, collective investment schemes and share transactions are 
excluded in terms of s 80N, and do not have to be reported. 
The taxpayers and their consultant should always bear in mind that whatever they do, 
South African Revenue Service would always have a way of dealing with those 
situations. The South African Revenue Service' enforcement powers have been widened 
with an expansion of the provisions relating to 'reportable arrangements'. In general, the 
promoter of certain transactions has a responsibility to report these arrangements to 
South African Revenue Service. This gives South African Revenue Service advanced 
warning of transactions that are taking place which may warrant further investigation. 
The following arrangements may have to be reported: 
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• a transaction where the calculation of interest and similar 
charges is dependent on tax assumptions 
• a transaction that has characteristics similar to the indications 
which lack commercial substance provided by GAAR 
• a transaction which is disclosed by a participant as a financial 
liability for GAAR, but not for tax 
• a transaction that will result in a reasonable expectation of pre-
tax profit for any participant being greater than the present 
value of the tax benefit 
• a transaction qualifying as a hybrid instrument as defined in 
s 8E if the period for determining this was lO years, instead of the normal 
3 years 
• an arrangement that may qualify as a hybrid instrument as defined in s 8F if 
the period was lO years, instead of the normal 3 years 
• a transaction specifically identified by the Commissioner as being reportable 
There are certain arrangements which are specifically excluded from being reported, 
these are: 
(a) no frill loans, advances or debts 
(b) where a borrower receives or will receive an asset and agrees to 
return the same in quality and quantity 
(c) a lease 
(d) transactions in terms of the Security Services Act No. 36 of 2004 
( e) transactions in relation to participatory interest in a collective 
investment scheme in securities 
The arrangement has to be reported within sixty (60) days after any amount is received 
or accrued to a participant in the arrangement. If the promoter or, in the absence of a 
promoter, any participants, do not report such an arrangement to South African Revenue 
Service, a fine ofRl million could be levied against the responsible person. 
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9.2.12 Remedies ofthe South African Revenue Service 
In order to apply the GAAR, the South African Revenue Service is given very wide 
powers to determine the tax consequences of an impermissible avoidance arrangement. 
The following options are available to the South African Revenue Service: 
• any steps in or parts of the arrangement can be disregarded, combined or 
recharacterised; 
• any accommodating party can be disregarded, or that party and any other party 
can be treated as one and the same person; 
• connected persons can be deemed to be one and the same person; 
• any gross income, receipt or accrual of a capital nature, expenditure or rebate 
may be reallocated among the parties; 
• very worryingly, any gross income, capital receipt or expenditure may be 
recharacterised (for example, an exempt dividend received may be 
recharacterised as taxable interest); and 
• as in the past, the arrangement can be treated as if it had been entered into or 
carried out, in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case, that South 
African Revenue Service deems appropriate. 
A small consolation is that, subject to prescription, the South African Revenue Service 
is obliged to make compensating adjustments to ensure consistent treatment of all the 
parties to the impermissible arrangement. Thus, for example, if the South African 
Revenue Service recharacterises a dividend received as interest, the South African 
Revenue Service must recharacterise the dividend paid as interest paid (though whether 
or not the recharacterised interest is deductible will have to be tested against the other 
requirements ofthe law). 
The South African Revenue Service's decision to invoke these remedies is subject to 
objection and appeal. 
A simple example demonstrating these powers is a subsidiary that borrowed money 
from its parent company to fund the subsidiary with working capital. The subsidiary 
then borrows money from a South African bank at a market related interest rate and 
repays the parent company. The parent company then invests the proceeds in 
redeemable preference shares issued by the same bank. One remedy (and there may be 
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others) which the South African Revenue Service may have is to treat the parent 
company and subsidiary as one and the same person. In this case, the South African 
Revenue Service could contend that the borrowed money was used to fund an 
investment in preference shares which yield tax-exempt dividends and, therefore, the 
interest ought to be disallowed as a deduction. 
In addition, solely for the purpose of determining whether a tax benefit indeed exists, 
the South African Revenue Service is empowered to treat connected persons as one and 
the same person and to disregard any accommodating party, or treat that party and 
another party as one and the same person. 
10 CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the above, the new GAAR is wide-ranging and replete with 
unfamiliar and new concepts, which will take years if not decades to be properly 
defined by the courts. 
While the South African Revenue Service has been aware of the need not to introduce 
uncertainty into doing ordinary, everyday business it has taken steps to eliminate 
elements of uncertainty. Large areas of uncertainty nevertheless remain as is evident 
from the above. 
One must not assume, however that by definition, the GAAR will apply every time there 
is an element of tax planning or tax structuring. The overall guideline must be that, as 
long as the tax structuring or tax planning is done within the confines of a proper 
commercial transaction or main purpose, then the requirement to obtain a tax benefit 
will not be satisfied. But, clearly, future transactions will have to be carefully 
scrutinised and tested against the new legislation. The new GAAR is with us and is now 
part of tax planning. And the more one analyses it in the light of practical situations, the 
more one realises its power and breadth. The introduction of the GAAR was justified by 
the South African Revenue Service and Treasury as being an important part of tax 
reform in South Africa. But it is recognised that broader tax reform is needed, and this 
was clearly stated in the original discussion paper and in the March 2006 interim 
response. The authorities acknowledge that many of the schemes which become 
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vulnerable to the GAAR were undertaken because the Act did not keep pace with modern 
developments in the economy. The following three major difficulties were highlighted: 
• The first concerned the lack of group relief, as a result of which losses in one 
subsidiary could not be offset against taxable income in another. 
• The second was that, while most fixed assets, including industrial buildings 
could be depreciated for tax purposes, commercial buildings could not. 
• Thirdly, South Africa suffers from the rather anomalous position that interest on 
a debt to finance the acquisition of a new business is allowed for tax purposes, 
but it is not allowed if, instead of buying the business, the taxpayer purchases 
shares in an existing company. 
Some schemes were undertaken to overcome these difficulties, including shifting profits 
within a group, concluding various complex transactions whose result is that much of 
the cost of a building is 'rolled up' into a rental charge or included into various 
arrangements to push debt down into an operating company. 
In the March 2006 interim response, the South African Revenue Service made the point 
that viewed from the taxpayer's perspective, a scheme may appear more as a much 
needed 'self-help remedy' than as an attempt to shirk a fair share of the tax burden. On 
the other hand, the South African Revenue Service did comment, correctly it is 
submitted, that many schemes go far beyond just 'righting the balance'. 
It remains to be seen whether any of these areas of reform will be introduced and if so, 
how soon? On 21 February 2007, the Minister of Finance presented his Budget Speech 
to Parliament. One of the announcements was that new commercial buildings, and 
upgrades to existing buildings, would be able to be depreciated at the rate of 5 per cent 
per year, i.e. over a 20 year period. This would seem to address, to some extent, the 
second area of reform referred to above, but, regrettably, nothing was mentioned about 
the first and third areas which are by far the more important. 
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11 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The provision ofs 103(1) has been subjected to substantial judicial enquiry. This has led 
to a wealth of judicial precedence being set. Nevertheless, the legislation is brief and a s 
103(1) enquiry is still subject to the uncertainties, which may arise in court proceedings. 
By contrast, s 80A to 8L is much more detailed in legislative content. Caution must be 
noted, in that although there are a plethora of definitions in s 80A to 80L supra, they 
have not as yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny. The contentions of the Memorandum 
that the s 80A to 80L provisions would provide more clarity, may be somewhat naive. 
Until such time as these provisions have been subjected to close scrutiny by the courts. 
It seems that judicial uncertainty has merely replaced legislative uncertainty. 
It does however; seem that s 80A to 80L represents a substantial improvement on the 
old s 103(1) provision. For example, the old Achilles heel attaching to the abnormality 
provisions appears to have gone and the new s 80A to 80L provides considerably more 
clarity in this regard. That in itself goes a long way to ensuring that the South African 
tax avoidance landscape has become more clearly defined. 
In summation, it is recommended that the existing s 80A to 80L legislation be further 
refined and drafted in a more sophisticated manner in order to overcome abnormalities 
that have already been referred to in this work. If this is successfully done, the South 
African Revenue Service can rightfully take its place amongst first World Countries 
(i.e. US, Canada, Germany, and Australia) in becoming a top class revenue collector. 
With respect to 'reportable arrangements', an arrangement which is supposed to be 
reported and if it is not, then the aspect of imposing a penalty of R1 million, should be 
revisited. A material fine of say R5 million hypothetically should be imposed, if a 
participant is found not to report such an arrangement. 
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